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DETERMINATION OF PATERNITY OF CHILD OF
PUTATIVE MARRIAGE

In concursus proceedings to determine the ownership of land
one claimant admitted she was in fact the grandchild of the deceased landowner's wife and her second husband by a bigamous
marriage. At the time, however, she claimed the legal filiation
of a grandchild of the deceased landowner, basing her argument
on Articles 184-192 of the Civil Code, under which the husband
of a married woman is presumed to be the father of her child
conceived or born during the marriage if he does not disavow it.,
The district court dismissed claimant's contention. On appeal,
the court of appeal, held, affirmed. Under the facts and circumstances of this case the presumption established by Article 184
cannot be invoked to fix the filiation of the claimant as a grandchild of the deceased landowner. Since there is no showing of
any bad faith on the part of the second husband, claimant's
mother is presumed to be the legitimate child of that husband
under the rules relative to putative marriages. Therefore claimant cannot claim any rights from the landowner by way of inheritance. Texas Co. v. Stewart, 101 So.2d 222 (La. App. 1958).2
The child of an invalid marriage contracted in good faith by
at least one of the spouses is legitimate8 as to both. 4 This rule
1. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 184-192 (1870).
2. Mention may be made here of a portion of the opinion not otherwise dealt
with in this note. When the property was acquired by the legal husband, not
only had his wife entered into a second marriage with a man deemed to be in
good faith, but the husband himself had married another woman also judged to
be in good faith. The court treated the property as community property, awarded
one-half to the legal wife and the legal husband's half to his putative wife. The
award of the husband's share to his putative wife was consistent with the established jurisprudence beginning with the decision of Patton v. Cities of Philadelphia
and New Orleans, 1 La. Ann. 98 (1846), but the failure to award a share in
the property to the legal wife's putative husband would seem inconsistent with
the decision in Prince v. Hopson, 230 La. 575, 89 So.2d 128 (1956). For the
reasons stated in two appraisals of Prince v. Hopson that the putative husband
was not a member of a marriage, one spouse of which acquired' the property, the
writer believes that such a solution would have been in error, but feels compelled
to raise the point in the light of the jurisprudence. See The Work of the Louisiana
Supreme Court for the 1955-1956 term- Persons, 17 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
303 (1957) ; Note, 17 LouIsIANA LAW REVIEW 489 (1957).
3. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 117-118 (1870).
4. The language in the court's opinion and its final disposition of the property indicate that the court may have acted on the assumption that the child in
question was to be considered legitimate as to its father, the putative second husband, but not as to her mother. Thus, although the court recognized the wife of
the deceased landowner as having an interest in the property, it treated her legal
husband, rather than her descendant by her putative marriage, the claimant in
this case, as her heir. Certainly the court could not have been mistaken with
regard to the ordinary rule of succession as expounded in LA. CIVIL CODE art. 915
(1870). Thus it must have assumed the child of the second marriage to be
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evidently is based on the proposition that neither the spouses to
an invalid marriage nor their children should be made to suffer
the ordinary consequences of the nullity of the union if the
spouses believed that they were contracting validly. But it may
be observed that the good faith spouse logically can operate only
to overcome the effects of nullity; although it can render the
child of the spouses legitimate rather than illegitimate, it cannot
of itself operate to make the child of the wife in fact that of
her husband any more than the validity of a marriage can of
itself make the wife's child in fact that of her legal husband.
Thus it would seem that before a child can be considered the
legitimate child of a good faith or putative marriage, it must be
ascertained to be that of the husband in the invalid marriage
as well as that of the wife. In the instant case, however, the
court did not articulate the basis on which it decided the child
to be that of the second husband rather than the first.
It is submitted that the paternity of a child born to a woman
invalidly married should be determined by the rules applicable
to a child born to a woman validly married. Probably no one
would dispute the applicability of these rules to determine the
paternity of a child born to a wife who was in a good faith or
putative marriage and, good or bad faith of itself being irrelevant to the issue of paternity as such, it would seem that the
same rules should apply to a child born of a wife in a bad faith
or non-putative marriage. In the case in which the mother of
the child is a party to one marriage situation only there is no
more than the usual difficulty in applying the rules where the
marriage is valid or invalid; but if the mother is both the wife
of one man by a valid marriage and that of another man by an
invalid marriage, as in the instant case, it seems that the same
rules, taken in their totality, should be applicable to both husbands. The determination of paternity in such a case, therefore, must be made within the framework of the same rules,
distinguishing the relevant facts in the two marriages.
In the instant case the mother of the child whose paternity
was put at issue apparently lived with the second husband and
not with the first. Thus, to ignore the legal rules for a moment,
it would seem consistent with ordinary reason to conclude that
legitimate as to the father and not as to her mother. It is submitted that the
child of an invalid marriage enjoys legitimate status as to both parents, even
though only one is in good faith, though the parent in bad faith may not claim
the rights of legitimate filiation against the child.
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the second husband, rather than the first, must have been the
father of the child. It is submitted that the rules in the Civil
Code on paternity, properly interpreted, would lead to the same
conclusion. If Articles 184-192 of the Civil Code, on the presumption concerning the paternity of a child born to a married
woman, are construed in the light of Articles 193-197, and Article 197 in particular, it can be concluded that the husband of
the mother who does not disavow the child is to be considered
its father only if the child can be said to have had the reputation
or appearance of being born of the particular union. 5 In the
instant case, therefore, the presumption mentioned would be
deemed applicable to the second husband but not to the first,
because the mother's living with the second husband would give
the child the reputation or appearance of being his and not that
of the legal husband. But the existing jurisprudence of the
Louisiana Supreme Court does not seem consistent with the
above given interpretation of Articles 184-192 and 193-197.
Thus the presumption of the husband's paternity of his wife's
child has been applied in situations in which her child did not
enjoy the reputation or appearance of being that of her husband. The court has, for example, applied the presumption
against the legal husband even where the wife lived exclusively
with another man in open concubinage. 6 The instant case is
apparently part of a trend of the court towards giving a child
legitimate status rather than determining actual filiation.
Some observations may be made on the finding of good faith
on the part of the second husband. It is to be observed that
the court simply presumed good faith on his part. This raises
the question whether good faith is always to be presumed if the
contrary is not shown. Here it appears that no evidence was
adduced at the trial concerning the good or bad faith of the
second husband, and he was never charged with knowledge that
there was an impediment to his marriage. The court seems to
have followed the prior jurisprudence in holding that where a
5. Under LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 193-197 (1870), a child may prove his legitimacy
by proving a reputation to this effect. If the child does not enjoy this reputation,
however, it must prove both birth from a married woman and, in addition, that
her husband was its father. Thus Article 197 specifically notes that even if the
child proves his mother to have been a married woman, those opposing his claims
may show that he was not the child of her husband. Thus it can be argued that
the presumption of paternity in Articles 184-192 is not applicable in instances in

which the child does not possess the reputation or appearance of legitimacy.
note 2

See

supra.

6. Succession of Saloy, 44 La. Ann. 433, 10 So. 872 (1892) ; Eloi v. Mader,
1 Rob. 581, 38 Am. Dec. 192 (La. 1841).
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man and woman enter into marriage there is a presumption
that the marriage, though null, was nevertheless contracted in
good faith.7 He who alleges bad faith must bear the burden of
proof and if there is doubt as to the good or bad faith of a party,
the issue will be resolved in favor of his good faith. 8 It has also
been said that the issue of good or bad faith, which necessarily
raises a question of fact, should be determined by the trial court.9
It is submitted that if evidence as to the good or bad faith of a
party cannot be produced, or if there is a conflict in that which
is produced, the presumption of good faith should prevail. However, if the question is never raised at the trial level, it would
appear that the case should be remanded to the lower court for
determination of the issue.
Charles Lindsey
LABOR LAW-

PEACEFUL PICKETING NOT RESTRAINT AND
COERCION OF EMPLOYEES

An employer charged that a union was restraining and
coercing employees in the exercise of their right to refrain from
union membership. After the union had been certified, unsuccessful contract negotiations precipitated a strike. The strike
continued for two years, during which time the striking employees were replaced by non-union employees. In a subsequent
election requested by the employer the new employees voted
overwhelmingly against representation by the union. The union
continued picketing and the company filed unfair labor practice charges with the NLRB. The picketing was at all times
peaceful. The employer charged that the union was picketing to
force it to recognize the union as bargaining agent for its employees, and thus to compel the employees to join the union or
lose their jobs. The trial examiner, relying on legislative history
and past Board decisions, rejected the employer's charge. The
Board reversed, finding that the conduct of the union was
designed to cause the employer to force its employees to join
the union or be discharged, and therefore violated Section
8(b) (1) (A).' On appeal the court of appeals, held, reversed.
7. Prince v. Hopson, 230 La. 575, 89 So.2d 128 (1956) ; Succession of Pigg,
228 La. 799, 84 So.2d 196 (1955) ; Succession of Fields, 222 La. 310, 62 So.2d 495
(1952) ; Succession of Chavis, 211 La. 313, 29 So.2d 860 (1947).
8. Funderburk v. Funderburk, 214 La. 717, 38 So.2d 502 (1949) ; Succession
of Chavis, 211 La. 313, 29 So.2d 860 (1947) ; Succession of Marinoni, 183 La.
776, 164 So. 797 (1935) ; Succession of Navarro, 24 La. Ann. 298 (1872) ; Eason
v. Alexander Shipyards, 47 So.2d 114 (La. App. 1950).
9. Succession of Chavis, 211 La. 313, 29 So.2d 860 (1947).
1. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (b) (1) (A) (1947) : "It shall be an unfair labor practice

